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Conceptual combination research investigates the processes involved in creating new meaning 
from old referents. It is therefore essential that embodied theories of cognition are able to 
explain this constructive ability and predict the resultant behavior. However, by failing to take 
an embodied or grounded view of the conceptual system, existing theories of conceptual 
combination cannot account for the role of perceptual, motor, and affective information in 
conceptual combination. In the present paper, we propose the embodied conceptual combination 
(ECCo) model to address this oversight. In ECCo, conceptual combination is the result of the 
interaction of the linguistic and simulation systems, such that linguistic distributional information 
guides or facilitates the combination process, but the new concept is fundamentally a situated, 
simulated entity. So, for example, a cactus beetle is represented as a multimodal simulation 
that includes visual (e.g., the shiny appearance of a beetle) and haptic (e.g., the prickliness of 
the cactus) information, all situated in the broader location of a desert environment under a hot 
sun, and with (at least for some people) an element of creepy-crawly revulsion.  The ECCo theory 
differentiates interpretations according to whether the constituent concepts are destructively, 
or non-destructively, combined in the situated simulation. We compare ECCo to other theories 
of conceptual combination, and discuss how it accounts for classic effects in the literature.
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combination in order to explain the constructive, generative, and 
creative capacities of human cognition. In this paper, we aim to 
address these oversights in proposing a theoretical model of con-
ceptual combination, embodied conceptual combination (ECCo) 
which draws on recent empirical and theoretical work in areas of 
language processing, mental representation, and links between our 
perceptual and conceptual systems.
In ECCo, we outline an embodied conceptual combination 
system based on a representation of knowledge that incorporates 
linguistic  distributional  information  and  situated  simulation. 
Linguistic information guides or facilitates the simulation proc-
ess, but the new concept created during conceptual combination is 
fundamentally a situated, simulated entity. The paper is divided into 
four main sections. In the rest of the introduction, we outline the 
structure of the conceptual system and review evidence for the roles 
of the linguistic and simulation systems during conceptual process-
ing. In Section “ECCo: Embodied Conceptual Combination”, we 
outline the core tenets of the ECCo theory and explain how it 
accounts for classical conceptual combination effects. In Section 
“Comparison  of  ECCo  with  Previous  Theories  of  Conceptual 
Combination”, we illustrate how ECCo relates to existing theories 
of conceptual combination and highlight key differences. Lastly, in 
Section “Concluding Remarks”, we summarize and briefly consider 
future directions for conceptual combination research.
The concepTual sysTem
Embodied theories of cognition hold that our perceptual, motor, 
and other experience plays a fundamental role in how we talk 
about, think about and interact with people, objects and the 
world around us. In essence, the same neural systems that are 
InTroducTIon
Cognition is inherently constructive. Our cognitive functioning is 
not confined to retrieving familiar ideas and concepts, but rather is 
predicated upon the ability to understand new things and represent 
new concepts. Conceptual combination research investigates the 
processes involved in creating and understanding new meanings 
from old referents. For example, how do people interpret novel 
combinations such as cactus beetle, mouse potato, or fame advantage? 
Such combinations are used liberally (conversations, newspaper 
headlines, signage, novels, etc.) and people generally have little dif-
ficulty in constructing plausible interpretations, even where the 
surrounding context may be quite limited or uninformative.
Of course, central to understanding how people process these 
combinations is an understanding of what constitutes the repre-
sentations of these concepts. Of existing theories of conceptual 
combination, many take an explicitly a modal view of the concep-
tual system (Wisniewski, 1997; Estes and Glucksberg, 2000). That 
is, concepts are represented in some abstracted format (e.g., feature 
lists, propositional representations) that do not relate directly to 
the modality-specific experiential basis of how these concepts were 
acquired. Other theories are agnostic as to the nature of the underly-
ing representation (Gagné and Shoben, 1997; Costello and Keane, 
2000), often using propositions as a descriptive or computational 
shortcut, but without making strong representational commit-
ments. We suggest that any theory that fails to take an embodied or 
grounded view of the conceptual system cannot account for the role 
of perceptual, motor, affective, introspective, and social information 
in conceptual combination and cognition more generally (Barsalou 
et al., 2008). The flip side of this argument is that current embodied 
theories of cognition must also draw on theories of conceptual Frontiers in Psychology  |  Cognition    November 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 212  |  2
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Affordances are key to the simulation system, and refer to the 
ways in which a particular object enables interaction (or mesh-
ing) with other entities (Gibson, 1979; Glenberg, 1997). A sweater 
affords filling with leaves in a way that a chair does not, and a 
leaf-filled sweater affords use as a pillow in a way that a rock-filled 
sweater does not (Glenberg and Robertson, 2000). In this example, 
the affordances of leaves, sweaters, and pillows mesh successfully 
within the situation of a person improvising a pillow on a camping 
trip. When affordances mesh successfully, they form a coherent and 
stable simulation, which is what allows conceptual processing to 
be both productive and creative.
evIdence for lInguIsTIc dIsTrIbuTIonal InformaTIon In 
concepTual processIng
The linguistic system contains statistical distributional informa-
tion that is powerful enough to support superficial strategies in a 
broad range of linguistic and conceptual tasks that might otherwise 
be assumed to require deeper processing (Glaser, 1992; Solomon 
and Barsalou, 2004). For example, Solomon and Barsalou (2004) 
showed that responses in property verification tasks, where par-
ticipants judge whether a property is usually true of an object (e.g., 
lemon-yellow) are predominantly based on word associations (e.g., 
“lemon” and “yellow” are closely associated, therefore respond yes) 
rather than on conceptual access. Indeed, this shallow, linguistic 
shortcut is the norm unless special care is taken to include filler 
items that are closely associated but nonetheless false (e.g., monkey-
banana), which forces people to simulate the entity in question in 
order to avoid associative errors. In terms of conceptual combina-
tion, knowledge of how words have previously combined affects 
how people understand and evaluate future word combinations. 
Lapata et al. (1999) showed that the co-occurrence frequencies of 
adjective-noun combinations (e.g., strong tea versus powerful tea) 
were highly correlated with human plausibility ratings of those 
combinations, while the frequency of the noun alone was not. 
Indeed, the influence of the linguistic system is not limited to lan-
guage stimuli. When participants were presented with two images 
in vertical alignment (e.g., a lamp above a table) and asked to judge 
whether the items usually appeared in those relative positions in the 
real world, Louwerse and Jeuniaux (2010) found that word order 
was a significant predictor of response times. Even though lamps 
are usually found above tables (and seldom below), people’s ability 
to perform this ostensibly visuospatial memory task was affected 
by the fact that “table … lamp” is a more common linguistic con-
struction than “lamp … table”.
Regarding the timecourse predictions of both LASS (Barsalou 
et al., 2008) and the SIH (Louwerse and Jeuniaux, 2008), recent 
evidence supports the notion of the linguistic system offering a 
fuzzy heuristic that operates faster than the more precise simula-
tion system. Louwerse and Connell (in press) analyzed the corpus 
distributions of a large set of perceptual object properties and 
found that, while human ratings are distinct for five perceptual 
modalities (i.e., auditory, gustatory, haptic, olfactory, visual: Lynott 
and Connell, 2009), distributional statistics identified only three 
“linguistic modalities” (i.e., auditory, visuo-haptic, and olfacto-
gustatory). Previous work had shown that that switching between 
perceptual modalities in consecutive trials incurs a processing cost 
(e.g., Pecher et al., 2003). In a modality switching paradigm that 
  responsible  for  representing  information  during  perception, 
action, and   introspection are also responsible for representing 
(or simulating) the same information during conceptual thought 
(e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Glenberg and Robertson, 2000; Wilson, 
2002; Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Gibbs, 2006). A concept is an 
aggregated memory of aspects of experience that have repeatedly 
received attention in the past, and incorporates perceptual, motor, 
affective, introspective, social, linguistic, and other information. 
For instance, a concept of dog could potentially include a host of 
perceptual-motor information, possibly including visual informa-
tion of the color and shape of a dog, tactile information regarding 
the feel of a dog’s coat, olfactory information of the smell of a 
dog, auditory information of a dog’s bark, motor information 
about patting a dog, social information about the status of dogs 
in human households, along with positive or negative affective 
valence depending on one’s experience with dogs in the past. Any 
time the word “dog” is encountered, a subset of these aspects will 
be retrieved to suit the task at hand. However, human language 
is full of statistical regularities. Words and phrases tend to occur 
repeatedly in similar contexts, just as their referents tend to occur 
repeatedly in similar situations, which allows people to build up 
substantial distributional knowledge of linguistic associations. In 
this way, lexical associates of “dog” are also activated (e.g., “bark,” 
“pet,” “cat,” etc.), which might in themselves suffice for a response 
and which in turn can activate their own simulation information. 
Importantly, the concept retrieved is situated and context-specific, 
with linguistic and simulation content changing dynamically with 
our experiences, current goals, and available resources. One can-
not, in effect, retrieve the same concept twice.
Thus, both linguistic and simulation systems are central to 
human  conceptualization  (Clark,  2006;  Barsalou  et  al.,  2008; 
Louwerse and Jeuniaux, 2010); language bootstraps simulations 
to facilitate more complex conceptual processing than would oth-
erwise be possible. The Language and Situated Simulation theory 
(LASS: Barsalou et al., 2008; see also the Symbol Interdependency 
Hypothesis, Louwerse and Jeuniaux, 2008), for instance, describes 
a general framework where both linguistic and simulation sys-
tems are simultaneously activated on encountering a word, with 
the linguistic system reaching peak activation slightly sooner than 
the simulation system. While it is a statistical trend that shallow, 
linguistic distributional responses are faster than responses that 
rely on deeper, situated simulation, the relative importance of each 
type of system will change according to the current context or 
specific task demands. In short, the concept to which a word refers 
is ultimately grounded in the simulation system, but a word does 
not need to be fully grounded every time it is processed (Louwerse 
and Connell, in press). It is important to note that distributional 
information in the linguistic system arises not only from associa-
tions between lexical items (e.g., between “dog” and “cat”), but also 
from associations between their referents in past experience (e.g., 
encountering cats and dogs in household pet situations). This con-
stant interactivity between the linguistic and simulation systems 
means that they are, to some extent, partial reflections of each 
other. However, the linguistic system offers a fuzzy approximation 
that can provide an adequate heuristic in certain tasks, whereas the 
simulation system provides representational precision for more 
complex conceptual processing.www.frontiersin.org  November 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 212  |  3
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were asked to judge whether a particular word corresponded 
to a particular target modality. They showed that people were 
slower and less accurate in responding to touch-related words 
(e.g., warm, itchy) than words related to vision, sound, taste, or 
smell. In both perceptual and conceptual processing, the tactile 
disadvantage reflects people’s difficulty in focusing attention on 
the tactile modality.
Another key phenomenon is the modality switching effect. In 
perception, switching costs arise when attention must be reallocated 
from one modality-specific neural system to another in successive 
trials: processing an auditory beep following a visual light flash 
following incurs a cost compared to when the trials are in the same 
modality (Spence et al., 2001; Turatto et al., 2004). Similar modal-
ity switching costs emerge when verifying properties in successive 
conceptual trials (e.g., auditory leaves can be rustling following 
visual apple can be shiny: Pecher et al., 2003; but see also Louwerse 
and Connell, in press), or when verifying a property following a 
perceptual stimulus (e.g., auditory leaves can be rustling following 
a visual light flash: van Dantzig et al., 2008). Moreover, modality 
switching costs are not just restricted to the retrieval of familiar 
conceptual information, but also emerge during conceptual com-
bination when a new conceptual entity is created. Connell and 
Lynott (in press) asked participants to interpret adjective–noun 
combinations that had been normed to produce interpretations 
that related strongly to one perceptual modality (e.g., interpreta-
tions for jingling onion were predominantly auditory). They found 
that people were slower to interpret novel compounds when they 
followed familiar compounds in a different modality (e.g., auditory 
jingling onion following visual shiny penny). Importantly, switch-
ing costs in this interpretation paradigm were not subject to the 
linguistic shortcut that Louwerse and Connell (in press) observed 
in a property verification paradigm. Rather, situating the simula-
tion of a novel conceptual combination in one perceptual modality 
incurs a switching cost if attention has already been grabbed by 
another modality.
Situated simulations are not just perceptual, but also extend to 
motor, affective, and other representations. Glenberg and Kaschak 
(2002) found that, when people read a sentence such as “You handed 
Courtney the notebook,” they were faster to make a movement 
away from their bodies (compared to towards their bodies), which 
is consistent with having simulated the situationally appropriate 
movement. Even the current physical situation of the body can 
influence conceptual processing. For example, participants who 
made their responses into a microphone were faster to process 
phrases about mouth-related actions (e.g., “to suck the sweet”) 
than  hand-related  actions  (e.g., “to  unwrap  the  sweet”),  even 
though there was no response time difference for participants who 
responded with a foot pedal (Scorolli and Borghi, 2007). Similar 
effects extend into the simulation of affective situations. People’s 
speed in understanding sentences that describe sad or unpleasant 
situations (e.g., “You hold back your tears as you enter the funeral 
home”) is facilitated when the mouth forms a pouting expression 
by holding a pen between the lips (Havas et al., 2007), but inhib-
ited when botulinum toxin has been used to immobilize the frown 
muscles (Havas et al., 2010). Similarly, adopting a congruent bodily 
posture facilitated people’s recall of various social situations such 
as opening a door for a visitor or applauding at a concert (Dijkstra 
asked people to verify modality-specific properties (e.g., haptic 
marble can be cool), Louwerse and Connell tested whether switch-
ing costs were better predicted by switches between three distribu-
tional linguistic modalities or five simulated perceptual modalities. 
Consistent with LASS and SIH predictions, fast responses showed 
an effect of linguistic switching, while slow responses showed an 
effect of simulated perceptual switching. In other words, not only 
do these findings demonstrate distinct roles for the linguistic and 
simulation systems, but also their relative impact in the timecourse 
of responses.
evIdence for sITuaTed sImulaTed InformaTIon In concepTual 
processIng
However, linguistic distributional information has limits. Previous 
experience with language will not suffice when trying to judge 
whether a description of a novel situation is sensible. People’s 
capacity to understand how a sweater filled with leaves can be 
used as a pillow is rooted in their ability to simulate the objects’ 
affordances and mesh them into a coherent situation (Glenberg 
and Robertson, 2000; see also “Affordances and Meshing in the 
Simulation System”). Just as objects, people, ideas, and emotions 
are encountered as part of broader, situated experience, the rep-
resentations that people create during conceptual processing are 
situated simulations. When reading about everyday objects, people 
simulate perceptual properties such as shape (Zwaan et al., 2002), 
color (Connell, 2007; Connell and Lynott, 2009), and spatial loca-
tion (Estes et al., 2008). For example, Estes et al. showed that peo-
ple were slower to respond to an X at the top of the screen after 
having read cowboy hat (as opposed to cowboy boot) because the 
simulation of a cowboy hat was occupying their attention in its 
typical, high location. In a property-listing task, Wu and Barsalou 
(2009) found that people listed visual features of novel adjective-
noun combinations that were occluded for the canonical noun: 
for example, roots and dirt were rarely listed for lawn, but were 
frequently listed for rolled-up lawn. Crucially, Wu and Barsalou 
showed that the pattern of property listing was not due to shal-
low processing in the linguistic system, but came from the visual 
simulation of the conceptual combination. Neuroimaging studies 
have also demonstrated modality-specific perceptual simulation 
during conceptual processing (see Barsalou, 2008, for review). 
González et al. (2006), for instance, found that passively reading 
scent-related words increased activation in the piriform cortex, an 
area normally activated during olfaction. Furthermore, Goldberg 
et al. (2006) showed that, when people verified properties related 
to color, sound, touch, and taste, regions of the cortex normally 
associated with perceiving visual, auditory, haptic, and gustatory 
information were activated.
Indeed, the emergence of several perceptual phenomena dur-
ing conceptual processing strongly suggests that the conceptual 
system has co-opted the perceptual system for the purposes of 
representation. One such phenomenon is the tactile disadvan-
tage: in perception, people are generally slower to detect tactile 
stimuli (e.g., finger vibration) than visual (e.g., light flash) or 
auditory (e.g., noise burst) stimuli, even when they are told which 
modality to expect (Spence et al., 2001; Turatto et al., 2004). 
Connell and Lynott (2010) replicated this effect in conceptual 
processing by using a modality detection task, where participants Frontiers in Psychology  |  Cognition    November 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 212  |  4
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hand, if a compound consists of two words that are very frequently 
  juxtaposed, then the linguistic heuristic will lead to its acceptance 
as sensible. Of course, participants do not have to rely solely on this 
linguistic shortcut just because it exists – they may use the simulation 
system as a double-check on any compounds that seem linguisti-
cally sensible, or some individuals may even base every decision on 
whether the concepts can combine into a coherent simulation – but 
an easy shortcut is hard to refuse. Because the linguistic heuristic is 
faster and computationally cheaper than basing a judgment on the 
simulation system, and because there are no penalties within the 
sensibility judgment paradigm to prevent its use (e.g., Solomon and 
Barsalou, 2004), participants can safely exploit it.
Interpretation  tasks  contrast  with  sensibility  judgments  in 
requiring deeper processing in the simulation system (Tagalakis 
and Keane, 2006; Lynott and Connell, 2010). If a participant is 
asked to give an interpretation for a noun–noun compound, then 
there must be an attempt to actually combine the concepts before 
making a response. If the concept affordances cannot be meshed in 
a situated simulation, then the compound will not be interpretable, 
but a successful situated simulation can be described in words as 
an interpretation for the compound. However, it is still sometimes 
possible for a noun–noun compound to be given a definitional 
interpretation predominantly on the basis of shallow, linguistic 
information. For example, a typological definition of cactus beetle as 
“a type of beetle” does not necessarily require any deep processing. 
Or if someone is told that a sun holiday is a holiday in the sun, she 
should be able to define a snow holiday as a holiday in the snow, 
or a desert holiday as a holiday in the desert, without necessarily 
requiring the simulation system. Because the linguistic and simula-
tion systems operate in overlapping waves, with only a statistical 
tendency for the linguistic system to be faster, such rapid definitions 
do not mean that the simulation system is not engaged at all. Rather, 
the definition can be triggered and the participant can respond just 
from linguistic information, but, even while speaking or pressing 
the response button, the situated simulation is still taking shape.
Affordances and meshing in the simulation system
Each concept in the compound has a myriad of potential affordances 
based on past experience, and many more can be created on the fly 
if the situation requires (Glenberg and Robertson, 2000). We use the 
term affordances in a broader sense than just the perceptual-motor 
properties proposed by Gibson (1979) and the action-enabling 
view proposed by Glenberg (1997; Glenberg and Robertson, 2000). 
Similar to Estes et al. (in press), we view affordances as embody-
ing much of what is often described as relational information, 
by referring to the ways in which a concept offers opportunities 
for meshing with other concepts. When the head and modifier 
concepts1 are paired in a compound, they mutually constrain the 
number and type of affordances that can be meshed (see Maguire 
et al., 2010).
et al., 2007). Taken collectively, the above evidence indicates that 
conceptual processing routinely requires perceptual, motor, affec-
tive, and social situated simulations.
ecco: embodIed concepTual combInaTIon
Both linguistic and simulation information are central to conceptual 
representations, and are therefore also central to the processes of con-
ceptual combination. When we refer to conceptual combination, we 
mean creating or understanding a new concept by actively combining 
two already-known concepts (e.g., mushroom chair as a chair shaped 
like a mushroom). Our goal in presenting an embodied theory of con-
ceptual combination is to put forward a single framework that can 
accommodate all the above evidence regarding the roles of the linguistic 
and simulation systems alongside the plethora of findings that have 
accumulated over the years in the conceptual combination literature. 
ECCo is thus the first theory of conceptual combination to do so.
The mechanisms described in this paper encompass the process-
ing of both lexicalized and novel compounds, since the end represen-
tation in both cases is still a situated simulation. However, actively 
constructing a meaning for a novel combination should be dis-
tinguished from simply retrieving already-known concepts labeled 
with a lexicalized phrase. For example, processing the compound 
office chair also relies on linguistic and simulation information, but it 
does not require an active conceptual combination process in order 
to be successfully simulated and understood because it has a strong, 
frequency-reinforced link between the phrasal unit and its simula-
tion (i.e., it is easily retrievable). A novel compound, conversely, is 
missing this link and therefore requires other means to arrive at a 
simulation and interpretation (i.e., a combination process).
combInaTIon processes
All conceptual combinations are situated, meaning that they involve 
representing a broader setting as part of the simulation. When a com-
pound is presented, both linguistic and simulation systems are rapidly 
engaged; activation begins to spread out from the words to other 
linguistic tokens, the neural mechanisms involved in direct experience 
begin to simulate perceptual, motor, affective, and other situated infor-
mation, and the two systems continually feed into one another (i.e., 
words help to activate simulations, and simulations help to activate 
words). In ECCo, as in other embodied theories of language compre-
hension (Barsalou et al., 2008), peak activation of the linguistic system 
is usually reached before peak activation of the simulation system. It 
is important to note that this is a statistical trend only – fast, shallow 
responses tend to rely more on linguistic information, and slow, deep 
responses tend to rely more on simulation information (e.g., Louwerse 
and Connell, in press) – but this trend can still influence the concep-
tual combination process, depending on the task at hand.
Differential task demands
 If a participant is simply asked whether a noun–noun compound 
is sensible (i.e., whether or not it makes sense: Gagné and Shoben, 
1997; Estes, 2003a), then this is a relatively shallow judgment for 
which the linguistic system offers a quick and dirty shortcut. If a 
compound consists of two words that have no shared statistical, dis-
tributional history, then the linguistic system will offer an heuristic 
for rejecting the compound as non-sensical without any attempt 
at  conceptual  combination  actually  taking  place.  On  the  other 
 1The constituent concepts in a combination (e.g., cactus beetle) have traditionally 
been referred to as the modifier concept (e.g., cactus) and the head concept (e.g., 
beetle); in English, the compound word order means that the modifier is assumed 
to come first and the head second. While we feel that this terminology is mislea-
ding – the “modifier” concept does not necessarily modify the head, and the “head” 
concept is not necessarily the primary focus of the combination – we have retained 
these terms for the sake of consistency with prior research.www.frontiersin.org  November 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 212  |  5
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what are the close associate words?), the interaction between the 
linguistic and simulation systems (e.g., has a similar simulation 
been created before for these kinds of concepts?), and the ease of 
creating the situated simulation itself (e.g., can the mutually con-
strained affordances mesh in a plausible situation?). Sometimes 
interpretation is easy, whether destructive or non-destructive, and 
sometimes effortful.
The main difference between destructive and non-destructive 
processes lies in how the affordances are constrained and meshed. 
The destructive process seeks to mesh the head and modifier con-
cepts together even if it means substantially reducing one of them, 
while the non-destructive process seeks to mesh the head and 
modifier affordances in a situation that allows both concepts to 
remain relatively intact. Note that in both destructive and non-
destructive processes, meshing the concept affordances is not solely 
the province of the simulation system. The linguistic system also 
helps to cue and create these affordances, and thus helps to deter-
mine which process is followed. Take the compound whale seal: 
immediately on encountering the word “whale,” closely associ-
ated linguistic tokens will be activated, including “fish,” “big,” 
“ocean,” and so on. Such tokens will, in their turn, begin to acti-
vate their relevant representations in the simulation system, such 
as “big” rapidly and automatically drawing attention to the visual 
and haptic modalities (Lynott and Connell, 2009; Connell and 
Lynott, 2010). Furthermore, whale seal is analogous to the (for 
some people) lexicalized phrasal token elephant seal, and so the 
simulation of this existing species of large seal will also begin to be 
formed. This rolling wave of linguistic and simulation activations 
will help to reduce whale to its bigness and to cue the affordance 
of seals coming in a variety of sizes, and so lead to the common 
interpretation of whale seal as a type of large seal. There are, of 
course, many other interpretations possible for whale seal (e.g., 
a seal that hunts whales, a seal with black-and-white orca-like 
markings), but they will all follow a similar course of affordance 
cuing and meshing.
Choice of process
Critically, destructive and non-destructive interpretations do not 
compete in parallel within the mind of any one individual. It is 
cognitively wasteful to pursue destructive and non-destructive 
processes concurrently, and, while possible, it is not the norm. 
Rather, even though both processes may be open to pursuit at 
the start of interpretation, one process is preferentially enabled 
by a number of interactive factors (depending on, e.g., frequency 
of encountering similar compounds, previous attentional focus 
on aspects of the concept, experience with a plausible non-
destructive situation, available perceptual resources for repre-
senting the destructive form of a concept). An individual thus 
commits quickly to either a destructive or non-destructive inter-
pretation, and attempts to create a coherent simulation using 
that process.
Take the concept elephant: usually, when people refer to ele-
phants they mean the holistic animal. Additionally, people have 
plenty of experience of the word being used to refer to something 
large and ungainly, both in isolation (e.g., “he’s such an elephant”, 
meaning he is of large build and/or is clumsy in his movements) 
and in lexicalized compounds (e.g., elephant seal and elephant 
Meshing describes the process of integrating the   complementary 
and  potentially  interactive  aspects  of  two  or  more  concepts, 
and “underlies  our  ability  to  understand  novel  combinations” 
(Glenberg, 1997, p. 6). Both concrete and abstract concepts can 
mesh affordances. Because relatively abstract concepts are heavily 
reliant on simulating perceptual, social, introspective (Barsalou 
and Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Wiemer-Hastings and Xu, 2005), and 
affective information (Kousta et al., 2010), they still afford mesh-
ing with objects, agents, and other entities that can cause changes 
in mental states. An elephant complaint (see “Choice of Process”) 
allows the concepts to mesh in a situation where either the com-
plaint itself is large and important, or where the elephant is the 
originator or subject of the complaint. Indeed, the affordances of 
relatively abstract concepts can be meshed in a variety of situa-
tions, including perceptual (e.g., value sandwich as a sandwich that 
is cheap or good value for money), social (e.g., fame advantage 
as the favorable position conferred by being well-known), affec-
tive (e.g., stress season as a particular time of year when people 
are extra-stressed), and so on. A successful mesh will result in a 
coherent and stable simulation, which is the goal of the conceptual 
combination process.
There are no hard and fast rules regarding whether a particu-
lar concept is suitable for meshing in a particular situation – it 
entirely depends on the other concept used. For example tree snake 
is unlikely to be a snake that eats trees, and so one could argue 
that, in fact, tree can never be meshed with an eating situation 
because trees just aren’t eaten. However, this assumption would be 
inaccurate. A tree termite could easily be a termite that eats trees; 
suddenly, trees afford eating. In short, it is not the case that one can 
independently slot the head and modifier concepts into a particular 
role or frame. The affordances of the head or modifier concept are 
affected by the other concept in the combination.
Affordances can be meshed in one of two ways. Sometimes, the 
head and modifier concepts are meshed directly with each other 
even if this involves substantial destruction of one of the concepts. 
For example, cactus and beetle can destructively combine into a 
spiky beetle because cactus is reduced to its spikiness, and beetle 
affords having a variety of exoskeleton shapes for defense or cam-
ouflage (thus giving rise to a situated simulation where the beetle 
wards off predators with its sharp spikes, or uses its green and spiky 
casing to hide on the surface of a cactus, etc.). However, sometimes 
this meshing is non-destructive as it incorporates the head and 
modifier concepts in a situation that requires little adaptation. For 
example, cactus and beetle mesh easily with an eating situation 
because beetles must eat something and cacti are a plausible food 
for beetles (thus giving rise to a situated simulation where the beetle 
is sitting on a cactus and eating away, or is munching a piece of 
cactus flesh as pet food, etc.).
Destructive and non-destructive processing
All else being equal, it is quicker to leave two concepts intact than to 
engage in situationally appropriate destruction. However, it’s rare 
that all else is equal between two possible interpretations, which 
means that non-destructive processing is often, but not necessar-
ily, faster than destructive processing. The length of interpretation 
time depends on the associations from the linguistic representation 
(e.g., does this compound resemble any lexicalized compounds? Frontiers in Psychology  |  Cognition    November 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 212  |  6
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indeed, both concepts being reduced: see llama camel in “Types 
of Interpretation”). For example, take butter police as referring to 
the dietary advisors who replace pats of butter in university can-
teens with low-saturate butter substitutes; here, police is reduced 
(to its function of enforcing regulations), while butter remains 
intact (because it is the thing being regulated). A stone duck (i.e., 
a statue), toy duck (i.e., a child’s plaything), or cloud duck (i.e., a 
distinctively shaped cloud) all reduce duck to its general shape, and 
in the toy’s case, maybe also its color: there is no longer an actual 
animal present in the simulation. Sometimes, reducing the head 
and leaving the modifier intact means that the focus of the inter-
pretation is actually on the modifier concept. In the earlier example 
of icicle fingers, most of the interpretations kept the focus on the 
head (i.e., cold fingers are still fingers). However, other interpreta-
tions of icicle fingers could focus on icicle, such as “finger-shaped 
icicles forming outdoors in the cold.” Such cases can be described 
as reversals, because the same interpretation could be produced 
from switching the order of the head and modifier (e.g., finger 
icicles). Similarly, cloud duck and duck cloud are both interpretable 
as a duck-shaped cloud. In this way, ECCo does not distinguish in 
principle between non-reversal and reversal destructive interpreta-
tions: both result from reducing one concept to certain situation-
ally relevant aspects and meshing with the other concept. Whether 
an individual chooses to reduce the head or modifier will depend 
on their past experience with similar words, concepts, combina-
tions, and situations.
Figurative combinations
Some compounds that could be described as having figurative 
interpretations  actually  use  existing  meanings  of  polysemous 
words. For example, tiger executive could refer to an executive 
who is fierce or ruthless in business dealings, but this interpre-
tation makes use of the fact that the word “tiger” already has a 
standard figurative meaning of fierce or ruthless (e.g., “used to 
refer to someone fierce, determined or ambitious”: New Oxford 
American Dictionary, 2009). In this case, the destructive inter-
pretation process is assisted by the rapid retrieval and simulation 
of fierceness from the tiger modifier, which can mesh with the 
head concept as a trait of the executive in question. Similarly, 
taste explosion exploits the standardized use of explosion to refer 
to suddenness in sensory experience (e.g., “a sudden outburst of 
something such as noise, light, or violent emotion”: New Oxford 
American Dictionary, 2009), which can easily mesh with taste in 
the simulation of a sudden burst of flavor in the mouth. In other 
words, such combinations are destructive interpretations that are 
greatly assisted by previous experience of a concept’s usage in a 
reduced form.
However, many other combinations that could be described as 
figurative are more novel in their juxtapositions. Such combinations 
tend to be destructive, with one or both concepts being reduced in 
the situated simulation to an adapted form of some situationally 
appropriate aspect. For example, the compound dragon soup can 
be interpreted as a hot and spicy soup with chili, which involves 
reducing dragon to its hot, fire-breathing aspect. The synesthetic 
conversion of hot from the sense of high temperature to that of chili 
spiciness is facilitated by the fact that the word “hot” is polysemous, 
with a conventional meaning that refers to the gustatory heat of 
  garlic both emphasize larger than normal size). Thus, experience 
has built up a link between the linguistic system’s “elephant” token 
and a simulation of largeness. Furthermore, because elephants tend 
to be larger than any surrounding creatures in most situations in 
which they are encountered, people have plenty of experience of 
their attention being drawn to the elephant’s large size, meaning 
that the simulation system is also likely to emphasize largeness 
in the visual and haptic components of the elephant simulation. 
Therefore, when one encounters the compound elephant complaint, 
one can either commit to keeping the elephant in its intact form 
or to using a reduced version.
For some people, the holistic form of elephant is highlighted 
(due to recency and priming effects as well as cumulative experi-
ence) and so they will attempt a non-destructive combination. Here, 
because elephant and complaint can mesh together in a situation 
where the elephant constitutes the reason for the complaint, the 
non-destructive interpretation of elephant complaint could be a 
complaint that people make about the behavior of an elephant at 
a zoo. For others, a reduced form of elephant is highlighted by its 
presentation in the compound and so they will attempt a destruc-
tive interpretation. Here, the elephant’s largeness can mesh with 
complaint in a situation where size is equated to seriousness, giving 
the destructive interpretation of elephant complaint as a large and 
important complaint. Of course, other destructive interpretations 
are possible if some other reduced form of elephant is highlighted 
for a particular person (e.g., a long-living complaint that is never 
resolved), because considerable individual differences exist in lin-
guistic and simulation experience.
desTrucTIve InTerpreTaTIons
A destructive interpretation occurs when one, or both, con-
stituent concepts are reduced during the interpretation process 
from their intact holistic forms to some situationally appropriate 
aspect(s) of the concepts. Sometimes one concept is reduced to 
a particularly salient or diagnostic aspect (e.g., the slowness of 
a snail, the black-and-white stripes of a zebra, the coldness of 
icicle), but, since both concepts mutually constrain each others’ 
affordances, what appears salient or diagnostic for a concept 
in isolation may not apply to a concept in combination. For 
example, icicle fingers may be interpreted as freezing cold fingers: 
here, icicle is reduced to its coldness because it can mesh with the 
affordance of fingers to have a variety of temperatures. However, 
icicle fingers can also be interpreted as cold and stiff fingers, even 
though stiffness is not usually a salient or diagnostic aspect of 
icicle in isolation, because fingers also afford variations in flex-
ibility according to temperature. We have experience of fingers 
being difficult to bend when they are particularly cold, and so 
reducing icicle to its coldness and stiffness allows the two concepts 
to mesh together. Indeed, such complementary affordances are 
part of situating the combination in our wider experience of 
cold and physical sensation.
Reversals
With destructive interpretations, the head concept usually remains 
intact  while  the  modifier  is  destructively  reduced,  but  this  is 
only a general pattern rather than a golden rule. Nothing pre-
cludes the modifier staying intact while the head is reduced (or, www.frontiersin.org  November 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 212  |  7
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Representational potential
Sometimes, a non-destructive combination does not need to have 
both head and modifier concepts fully present in the simulation, 
but instead the situation allows one concept to exist in potentia. 
For example, coffee cup is a lexicalized compound, but it can be 
represented in more than one way: as a cup that contains coffee, 
or as a cup that can potentially contain coffee as its usual purpose. 
In the latter case, there is technically no coffee present. However, 
this absence does not mean that the interpretation is destructive. 
Rather, because the situated simulation involves a representational 
placeholder for an intact concept of coffee, it is a non-destructive 
interpretation in which the modifier concept exists in potential 
form. Similarly, cactus beetle (meaning a beetle who eats cacti) does 
not necessarily require a cactus to be present in the simulation, but 
the representational potential for an intact cactus concept means 
that the interpretation is non-destructive.
In terms of simulation content, the potential coffee or cactus in 
such interpretations is similar to the representation of a negated 
object. Kaup et al. (2006) found that, after reading a sentence such 
as “there was no eagle in the sky,” people were faster to respond to 
a picture of a eagle with outstretched wings than if they had just 
read “there was no eagle in the nest.” In other words, even though 
there was no eagle present in the described situation, the poten-
tial shape of the eagle was nevertheless simulated. Likewise, even 
though there may be no cactus present in the above interpretation 
of cactus beetle, the potential existence of cactus (as a source of food 
for the beetle) is still simulated.
The ImporTance of experIence
Any two randomly paired nouns can be processed as a conceptual 
combination, but past experience will make some compounds 
more likely than others to produce a plausible interpretation in 
most people. An interpretation will be plausible if it fits with prior 
experience and knowledge (Costello and Keane, 2000; Connell and 
Keane, 2004, 2006). It is important to note that plausibility does 
not depend solely on experience of the real, mundane world, but 
that experience of fictional words also counts. The consequence is 
that interpretations do not have to adhere to the conventional laws 
of gravity (e.g., elephant bubble as an elephant floating around in a 
bubble), genetic combination (e.g., canary pear as a cross between 
a canary and a pear), actuality (dragon soup as a soup made with 
dragon meat), or animacy (chair complaint as a chair complaining 
about being sat upon) in order to be plausible. In other words, prior 
experience counts whether vicarious and fictional or direct and 
physical. For example, more than one of our participants (Lynott 
and Connell, 2010) interpreted octopus apartment as an underwater 
apartment where an octopus lives, like in Spongebob. While there 
is no octopus character in the cartoon Spongebob Squarepants, 
there are, nonetheless, a number of other sea creatures, such as crab, 
squid, and starfish, who live in underwater houses and apartments. 
Thus, the cartoon world of Spongebob Squarepants provides a use-
ful set of situational affordances into which octopus and   apartment 
can plausibly fit.
If the simulation can mesh the head and modifier into a familiar 
situation (e.g., horse house as a stable), then this interpretation will 
be readily accepted. Even if the head or modifier concepts do not 
fit the situation exactly, past experience may still provide a useful 
chilies (see also Lynott and Connell, 2009). Hot, spicy chili is thus 
not a directly reduced aspect of dragon, but is rather an aspect 
that has adapted from tactile heat to gustatory heat, assisted by the 
linguistic system that allows the simulation of spicy taste from the 
word “hot,” which then affords meshing with soup. In other words, 
many ostensibly figurative interpretations are destructive interpre-
tations that are greatly assisted by previous experience of how a 
concept’s associates may be simulated in more than one form.
non-desTrucTIve InTerpreTaTIons
A non-destructive interpretation occurs where the constituent con-
cepts remain relatively intact in a shared situation. Both concepts, 
in their holistic forms, have mutually constrained affordances that 
mesh together in a situated simulation. An octopus apartment, for 
example, could be an apartment where an octopus lives: octopus 
affords having a place to live, and apartment affords providing a 
home, and so the two concepts mesh in a living arrangements situ-
ation. As with destructive interpretations, participants frequently 
specify details of how they have situated their simulation when 
they give interpretations. Many of our participants (Lynott and 
Connell, 2010) situated their simulations in ways that explain why 
an octopus might be living in an apartment, such as “an apartment 
for an octopus in an octopus sanctuary,” “an apartment that has 
a pet octopus in it,” or “an underwater apartment block for an 
octopus, like in Spongebob” (see “The Importance of Experience”). 
Although each of these participants situated their simulations 
slightly differently, they all succeeded in combining the concepts 
non-destructively  as  variants  of  the “place  where  an  octopus 
lives” interpretation. Indeed, a conceptual combination can often 
be non-destructively interpreted in very different ways because 
the concepts have meshed in different situations. For example, 
a kidnapper killer could either be someone who kills kidnappers 
(because a killer must have a victim, and a kidnapper affords being 
the target of a killer for a variety of revenge or vigilante reasons), or 
a kidnapper who kills his or her victims (because both kidnapper 
and killer have victims, and afford merging the two crimes into 
the actions of one individual).
Reversals
In many non-destructive combinations, the order of the head and 
modifier concepts is not particularly important to the way in which 
the affordances mesh. The only difference is attentional focus. For 
example, an octopus apartment (as an apartment where an octopus 
lives) and an apartment octopus (as an octopus who lives in an 
apartment) essentially describe the same situation, with attention 
focused on different elements according to which concept is in the 
head position (although attentional focus can also be influenced 
by contextual and prosodic effects: e.g., Fernald and Mazzie, 1991). 
The level of detail is likely to differ according to attentional focus, so 
that a simulation of a murder town may situate extra details on the 
safety and desirability of the town itself, while a town murder may 
situate extra details on the nature or victim of the murder. ECCo 
therefore takes the same position with non-destructive interpreta-
tions as it does with destructive interpretations: it does not distin-
guish in principle between non-reversal and reversal interpretations 
because, in many cases, the simulation is essentially the same and 
only differs in attentional focus.Frontiers in Psychology  |  Cognition    November 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 212  |  8
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a mailbox), and 5-year olds’ performance was at adult level. In 
contrast, performance of both age groups was much worse for 
compounds that reduced the modifier concept to just a single visual 
feature, such as basic shape (e.g., mitten leaf as a leaf shaped like a 
mitten), or color/pattern (e.g., zebra shells as shells patterned with 
black-and-white stripes). Indeed, for these items, the 3-year-old 
children were close to chance in choosing the correct picture. These 
findings suggest that, by the age of three, children are willing and 
able to destructively interpret noun–noun compounds, but find it 
easier to do so when more of the modifier concept is left intact in 
the simulation.
Furthermore, there is some evidence that children aged three 
and younger may have difficulty with non-destructive interpre-
tations where one concept exists in potentia (e.g., a baby bottle 
does not require that a baby is actually present in the simula-
tion, but instead has the representational potential for the baby’s 
existence). Krott et al. (2010) used novel words and objects in 
an attempt to control the amount of information children had 
about the concepts being combined. Children were introduced 
to a pair of novel objects in two different configurations, either 
showing possession/attachment (e.g., two objects that have been 
glued together, described as “a donka that has a kig”) or function 
(e.g., one object is actively placed inside the other, described as “a 
donka that holds a kig”). When asked to point to the kig donka, chil-
dren aged four and over behaved like adults in choosing each type 
of combination in approximately equal numbers. However, very 
young children (2- and 3-year olds) tended to prefer the simple 
combination where both objects were permanently joined to one 
another. In other words, the youngest children found it difficult 
to represent a kig donka as an object whose function is to hold a 
kig, because such a combination would require that the kig be 
represented in potentia (i.e., it is still a kig donka whether or not a 
kig is present). Thus, between the ages of two and four, children 
begin to lose their preference for representing two intact concepts 
and become capable of simulating the potential existence of one 
concept in a combination.
accounTIng for classIcal effecTs In concepTual combInaTIon
As well as offering a theoretical model that is based on the impor-
tance of grounded simulations in conceptual representation, the 
ECCo theory is also consistent with empirical findings from decades 
of classical conceptual combination research.
Property specificity
People represent the same color term differently depending on 
the object it describes. For example, Halff et al. (1976) found that 
people represented the color red differently when paired with hair, 
wine, flag, brick, and blood. Using a similarity-rating paradigm, they 
found that people rated the similarity of red flag and red light to be 
greater than the similarity between red light and red wine. Similarly, 
Medin and Shoben (1988) found that, when asked to compare the 
color gray with both black and white, people considered gray to 
be more similar to white in the context of hair, but more similar 
to black in the context of clouds. In terms of perceptual simula-
tion, these results are unsurprising and largely inevitable. Since 
all of these words and combinations refer to known or lexicalized 
concepts no actual combination process is required to understand 
basis for interpretation because compounds are often interpreted 
by analogy with a more familiar compound (Lynott et al., 2004; 
Tagalakis and Keane, 2006). A bullet car, for instance, is similar to the 
lexicalized compound bullet train, and people interpret it similarly 
(i.e., as a fast car) rather than some other plausible interpretation 
(i.e., a car for transporting bullets). Such use of past experience 
with related combinations is fundamental to ECCo’s account of 
the combination process. The fact that “car” and “train” are closely 
related linguistic tokens, and the fact that a simulation of car can 
be situationally adapted in many of the same ways as a simulation 
of train, means that familiarity with a bullet train makes a bullet 
car easier to interpret.
concepTual combInaTIon In developmenT
Children are capable of both destructive and non-destructive 
conceptual combination from quite early stages of linguistic and 
conceptual development. By the age of three, most children can 
process a variety of non-destructive conceptual combinations. For 
example, Clark et al. (1985) found that, when asked to point to the 
mouse hat, most 3-year olds could reliably point to the relevant 
picture (i.e., a mouse wearing a hat) as opposed to distractor pic-
tures of a mouse, a hat, or a fish wearing a hat. Performance for 
these non-destructive combinations was at ceiling by the age of 
four. Nonetheless, children of this age group are also capable of 
destructive conceptual combination. When asked to point to the 
picture of a rabbit car, 3-year olds preferred to point to a destruc-
tive interpretation (i.e., a car with rabbit ears and a fluffy tail) 
than a non-destructive alternative (i.e., a car beside a rabbit) or 
pictures of either object alone (Nicoladis, 2003). Four-year olds 
showed the same pattern, but were even more likely to choose 
the destructive interpretation. While it could be argued that the 
available non-destructive interpretations were in some way inferior 
or unlikely (e.g., a sun bag as a bag beside a multi-rayed cartoon 
sun), they nonetheless represented a valid means of distinguish-
ing the compound subcategory from the head category (e.g., the 
bag beside the sun as opposed to the bag by itself); a pragmatic 
reason for conceptual combination (Downing, 1977; Clark et al., 
1985; Wisniewski, 1997). Indeed, when children were given only 
two options to chose from – the destructive and non-destructive 
interpretations – they showed equal preference for both pictures 
(Gottfried, 1997). In other words, while children were capable of 
both destructive and non-destructive conceptual combination, 
they were not always sure which was the “correct” strategy for 
interpreting the compound.
Many of the difficulties experienced by children in understand-
ing novel compounds are consistent with a preference to simulate 
two  intact  concepts,  with  younger  children  in  particular  hav-
ing problems with combinations that require extensive concept 
destruction or representation of a concept in potentia. Regarding 
destructive conceptual combination, Gottfried (1997) found that 
certain types of destruction were harder than others for children 
to process. Compounds like fish plate or butterfly mask, where the 
modifier concept has been reduced to multiple visual features such 
as shape, texture, and color, posed few problems for children. In 
a picture-pointing task, 3-year olds could successfully identify the 
destructive interpretation (e.g., a mask decorated to look like a 
butterfly) as opposed to distractors (e.g., a butterfly, a mask, or www.frontiersin.org  November 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 212  |  9
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that suggest why a helicopter might need to be covered, such as 
the cover being camouflaged, waterproof, fireproof, or durable. 
In ECCo, such emergent features are an inevitable consequence 
of a situated simulation.
Relation frequency
Interpretations that use a high-frequency relation of the modifier 
(mountain lake, mountain cabin, mountain stream are all located 
in mountains) are understood more quickly than ones that use 
a low-frequency relation (mountain magazine is about moun-
tains; Gagné and Shoben, 1997). In ECCo, strong links between 
the modifier word in the linguistic system and particular situ-
ations in the simulation system (e.g., between “mountain” and 
a situation where entities or events have a mountain location) 
would lead to that situation being a strong candidate for mesh-
ing head and modifier affordances. However, recent evidence 
suggests that relation frequency applies to classes of groups of 
concepts rather than individual lexical items (e.g., the category 
geographical location rather than the specific modifier mountain), 
and that combination times are influenced by relational frequen-
cies of the head interacting with those of the modifier (Maguire 
et al., 2010). In ECCo, such a finding is consistent with the idea 
that not only do people situate the entire combination during 
interpretation, but also that the affordances of the constituents 
of the combination constrain the possible interactions between 
the concepts. So, for example, a mountain rat is quickly and easily 
interpreted as a rat who lives in the mountains because mountains 
afford providing habitats for animals (similar to mountain goat, 
mountain dog), and rats afford having habitats in a variety of 
geographic locations (similar to desert rat, river rat), and so the 
affordances mesh in a habitat situation. In contrast, mountain 
carpet will take longer to interpret as a carpet with a pattern of 
mountains because there are fewer similar compounds to help 
mutually constrain the affordances: people have little experience 
of meshing mountains with fabric designs, or meshing carpets 
with geographical locations.
Context
A key issue in conceptual combination research has been whether 
the processes involved in interpreting novel combinations in and 
out of context are the same. Gerrig and Bortfeld (1999) showed that, 
out of context, the combination doll smile is more quickly inter-
preted than the combination baseball smile, but they are understood 
equally quickly in a supportive context. In ECCo, whether a combi-
nation is encountered in or out of context, it must be appropriately 
situated to be understood. The only difference a surrounding dis-
course context makes is to allow some or most of this situation to be 
already in place when a person encounters the novel combination. 
Obviously, prespecifying a complete situation can tightly constrain 
the possible interpretations that are situationally appropriate, and 
even suggest affordances for combinations that would ordinarily 
be difficult to situate. In Gerrig and Bortfeld’s work, the discourse 
contexts clearly established a meaning for the novel combinations 
in advance. Therefore, when people encountered the novel combi-
nation, much of the hard work of simulating a situation is already 
done, thereby minimizing the differences between the compounds 
that had appeared out-of-context.
them. Rather, a simple retrieval process will suffice. Because the 
redness of wine and the redness of a light are initially perceived as 
being different hues, they will be perceptually simulated as differ-
ent hues. The same could be said of other object properties such as 
size: a tall ladder and a tall man are perceived differently (i.e., a tall 
ladder would be considerable taller than a tall man) and so their 
perceptual simulation will reflect these differences.
Typicality gradients
For any given category it is possible to list members of that category 
in descending order of their typicality. So, people judge members 
of the category “spoon” to be typically small and metal. However, 
people also readily agree that large wooden spoons are typical mem-
bers of the “spoon” category, equal to small metal spoons (Medin 
and Shoben, 1988). As with the property specificity, this effect is not 
surprising when such retrieval is based on situated simulations of 
prior experience rather than the rearrangement or modification of 
correlated size and substance attributes within an amodal SPOON 
concept. From an embodied perspective, small metal spoons and 
large wooden spoons are used in very different situations with dif-
ferent accompanying objects (e.g., adding sugar to a teacup versus 
stirring ingredients in a mixing bowl), different grips (precision 
versus power), different motor actions (finger and wrist movement 
versus full arm and shoulder movement), and even different bodily 
postures (often sitting versus standing). Thus, in ECCo, because 
people simulate situationally appropriate information when they 
retrieve concepts, we should not be surprised that people are happy 
to accept both large wooden spoons and small metal spoons as rep-
resenting typical spoon experiences.
Emergent properties
When people are asked to list features or properties of a com-
bined concept they often list features that are not mentioned for 
the concepts in isolation. For example, pet birds are described as 
living in cages and able to talk, even though these features are not 
listed for pet or bird in general: such features have been described as 
emergent properties (Hampton, 1987). Since pet bird is a lexicalized 
compound, people will be able to form a situated simulation by 
retrieval (rather than by active conceptual combination), which is 
likely to contain situational information as to where the bird lives 
(in a cage or aviary) and what sounds it makes (learned words and 
phrases as well as squawks). Thus, these so-called emergent features 
do not materialize from the ether, but rather come from the situated 
nature of the simulation, based on each individual participant’s 
own experience of pet birds (see also Barsalou, 1999).
To take a more novel example, a helicopter blanket is often said 
to be waterproof, even though neither helicopters nor blankets are 
generally described as such (Wilkenfeld and Ward, 2001). Here, 
although the combination helicopter blanket may not be directly 
retrievable due to its novelty, the same story applies. Because peo-
ple create a situated simulation for any combination they fully 
interpret, its situation will often contain information that may 
not necessarily be present in more usual experiences of a concept 
(e.g., a blanket on a bed). By situating a helicopter blanket out-
doors as part of the process of meshing the concepts into a type 
of cover for a helicopter, many of Wilkenfeld and Ward’s partici-
pants included situationally-appropriate details to their simulation Frontiers in Psychology  |  Cognition    November 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 212  |  10
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a typical yellow banana alongside the specified green banana. 
Thus, pending new evidence of compositionality in the process-
ing of novel compounds, ECCo remains equivocal on whether 
parallel simulations occur when two concepts are being meshed 
for the first time.
comparIson of ecco wITh prevIous TheorIes of 
concepTual combInaTIon
ECCo dispenses with many of the assumptions and dichotomies 
that are traditional in much conceptual combination research. In 
this section, we will concentrate on five current accounts of con-
ceptual combination (see Table 1). Competition among relations 
in nominals (CARIN: Gagné and Shoben, 1997) posits that peo-
ple interpret novel combinations using a set of thematic relations 
(e.g., made of, located, used by), where processing time depends 
on how often a particular relation has been previously used with 
the modifier concept. Dual process theory (Wisniewski, 1997) 
holds that two different processes compete in parallel to generate 
different types of interpretation for a compound: property-based 
interpretations are constructed by applying a property of the 
modifier to the head concept, while relation-based interpreta-
tions are constructed by binding the concepts to thematic roles 
in an augmented schema. The interactive property attribution 
model (IPA: Estes and Glucksberg, 2000) allows for both property 
and relational interpretations, but specifies that both types arise 
from the interaction of candidate modifier features and relevant 
head dimensions. Constraint theory (Costello and Keane, 2000) 
asserts that people use three pragmatic constraints – diagnostic-
ity, informativeness, and plausibility – in order to narrow down 
the wide range of possible interpretations to an optimal few. 
Lastly, the retrieval–composition-analysis model (RCA: Prinz, 
2002) argues for three stages of combination: attempt to retrieve 
lexicalized meaning, compositional integration of concepts (with 
two parallel processes for property and relational interpreta-
tions, as in dual process theory), and analysis using background 
knowledge. While there are many potential issues for discussion, 
the rest of this section will focus on the key areas in which ECCo 
diverges from previous theories.
TheoreTIcal dIfferences
ECCo differs from previous theories in many major ways. Table 1 
summarizes the principal positions, with the most fundamental 
issues discussed below.
Nature of conceptual representation
ECCo describes how both the linguistic and simulation systems 
are central to conceptual representations. Of the existing theories 
of conceptual combination, some are agnostic as to the nature of 
the underlying representation (CARIN, constraint theory), while 
others take an explicitly amodal view of the conceptual system 
(dual process and IPA theories). Such views of the conceptual sys-
tem lie in contrast to the embodied perspective that views concep-
tual representations as situated simulations. Both ECCo and the 
RCA model commit to the perceptual and motor basis of much 
of the conceptual system, although the RCA model describes 
concepts as frames or schemata that contain feature slots with 
particular values. In contrast, ECCo highlights the importance 
Similarity
A compound is more likely to be interpreted in a destructive man-
ner when its constituent concepts are similar (Wisniewski, 1997; 
Wilkenfeld and Ward, 2001). In such cases, it is more difficult to 
find a situation in which reasonably similar head and modifier con-
cepts can mesh complementary affordances. For example, take the 
compound zebra clam, which combines two animals: it is difficult 
to generate a plausible situation that would allow both zebra and 
clam to be kept relatively intact because their affordances do not 
lend themselves to mesh in a single situation. Instead, it is easier to 
allow zebra to be destructively reduced to its color and pattern in a 
situation where clam remains intact, because clam affords having 
a variety of markings and textures on its shell. It is likely that such 
statistical regularities (i.e., that concepts from the same broad class, 
such as “living things,” tend toward destructive combination) are 
reflected in the linguistic system. Thus, in ECCo, encountering two 
similar tokens in a compound will lead to preferential activation of 
potential situations that involve destruction. Such situations may 
involve meshing one concept with the other on the basis of visual 
markings (e.g., zebra clam as a striped clam), size (elephant carrot 
as a huge carrot), thickness and texture (coat shirt as a thick, heavy 
shirt), motor function (hammer shoe as a shoe used to hammer in 
a nail), and many more.
In  addition,  the  destructive  combination  process  decreases 
  perceived similarity between the constituent concepts. Estes (2003b) 
found that people believed concepts such as zebra and clam to be 
moderately similar when simply asked for their rating, but less 
similar when they had first interpreted zebra clam to be a striped 
clam. This finding is consistent with ECCo’s account of destructive 
interpretations; because there was relatively little of the original 
zebra concept left in the simulation, participants judged it to be 
quite dissimilar to clam. Furthermore, non-destructive interpreta-
tions show the opposite pattern by increasing perceived similarity 
between constituent concepts. Estes also found that people tended 
to judge concepts such as mountain and snake as more similar if 
they first interpreted the compound (i.e., as a snake that lives in 
mountainous areas). Since similarity between concepts is enhanced 
when they are incorporated in the same scenario (Wisniewski and 
Bassok, 1999), Estes’s participants rated the concepts as more simi-
lar because their simulation of the non-destructive interpretation 
left the constituent concepts intact.
Compositionality
Evidence is mixed regarding whether emergent properties of a 
compound (e.g., green for unripe banana) are represented faster 
(Springer and Murphy, 1992) or slower (Swinney et al., 2007) 
than properties that are true of the head concept but not the com-
pound (e.g., yellow for unripe banana). However, these experi-
ments predominantly used lexicalized compounds like boiled 
celery or peeled apple, which constitute concept retrieval rather 
than true combination. We know from other work in sentence 
processing that, when context implies an atypical representa-
tion of a concept (e.g., an unripe banana as opposed to a typi-
cally ripe one), both typical and atypical versions of the concept 
are simulated in parallel (Connell and Lynott, 2009). A similar 
mechanism could operate in the processing of lexicalized com-
pounds, where unripe banana leads people to rapidly simulate www.frontiersin.org  November 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 212  |  11
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Types of interpretation
Embodied conceptual combination describes interpretations as 
destructive or non-destructive, depending on whether the con-
stituent concepts are reduced or left intact when their affordances 
are meshed. In contrast, existing theories of conceptual combina-
tion tend to categorize interpretations as relation-based (e.g., cactus 
  beetle as a beetle that eats cacti) and property-based (e.g., cactus bee-
tle as a spiky beetle), although CARIN disagrees that property-based 
interpretations constitute a distinct type. Dual process, constraint 
and RCA theories also include hybrids (e.g., llama camel as a cross 
between a llama and a camel, or a creature that is half-llama and 
half-camel) and/or conjunctives (e.g., pet rhino is both a pet and a 
rhino). However, the need for this fragmentation of interpretation 
of affective and social information as well as sensorimotor (par-
ticularly for more abstract concepts), and describes conceptual 
structure in terms of affordances that are meshed when situating 
a simulation (see “A” ffordances and Meshing in the Simulation 
System”). Furthermore, no theory but ECCo underscores the 
importance of distributional linguistic information in conceptual 
combination2, and how it can predominate depending on task 
demands (see “Differential Task Demands”).
Table 1 | Comparison of ECCo with existing theories of conceptual combination.
Theoretical 
position
CARIN (Gagné 
and Shoben, 1997; 
Gagné, 2000; 
Gagné and 
Spalding, 2004)
Dual process theory 
(Wisniewski, 1997; 
Wisniewski and 
Love, 1998; 
Wisniewski and 
Murphy, 2005)
Constraint theory 
(Costello and 
Keane, 2000)
IPA (Estes 
and 
Glucksberg, 
2000)
RCA (Prinz, 2002) ECCo
Nature of 
representations in 
conceptual 
combination
Not specified, 
although includes 
distributional 
knowledge of 
relation frequency
Amodal schemata 
with slots and fillers 
(but see Storms and 
Wisniewski, 2005)
Not specified, but 
modeled as amodal 
schemata with slots 
and fillers
Amodal 
schemata 
with slots 
and fillers
Sensorimotor-
based schemata 
with slots and 
fillers
Linguistic 
distributional 
information and 
situated simulation 
of meshed 
affordances
Distinct types of 
interpretation
Relational Relational, property, 
hybrid
Relational, property, 
hybrid
Relational, 
property
Relational, 
property, hybrid
Destructive, 
non-destructive
Modifier-head 
reversals normal
No No Yes No No Yes
Perceptual 
information affects 
combination 
process
No No No No Yes (by 
assumption, given 
nature of 
representations)
Yes
Different 
interpretation types 
arise from
Same process Distinct, parallel 
processes
Same process Same 
process
Distinct, parallel 
processes
Early commitment 
to one of two 
related processes
Role of conceptual 
knowledge (apart 
from constituent 
concepts) in the 
combination 
process
Limited to final 
elaboration stage
Central to scenario 
construction for 
relational 
interpretations
Central to applying 
plausibility 
constraint
Not 
addressed
Central to final 
analysis stage
Central to creating 
simulation
Role of surrounding 
context in the 
combination 
process
Can increase 
relation availability
Can indicate relevant 
modifier feature for 
property 
interpretations
Not addressed Not 
addressed
Can affect 
integration of 
dimensions in 
composition stage
Central to creating 
simulation
Emergent 
properties arise 
from
Not addressed Elaboration with 
background 
knowledge
Additions from 
instances or 
abstract domains
Not 
addressed
Instance retrieval or 
elaboration with 
background 
knowledge
Situated nature of 
simulation
Consistent with 
developmental 
trajectory
No No No No No Yes
 2CARIN does incorporate a type of distributional information in the form of rela-
tion frequencies. However, the scope of this information is much narrower in CARIN 
than in ECCo as it does not consider other types of statistical linguistic information 
nor its interaction with the simulation system (see also “Relation Frequency”).Frontiers in Psychology  |  Cognition    November 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 212  |  12
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Table 1). For example, the IPA model does not specify any role for 
wider conceptual knowledge in the combination process, contrary 
to the other theories (which specify a limited role at some point 
during processing) and to ECCo (which regards wider conceptual 
information as an inevitable and important resource in situating 
the simulation). Similarly, neither the IPA model nor constraint 
theory have addressed how context affects conceptual combina-
tion, while other theories allow it to influence the availability of 
relations or properties, and ECCo regards wider context as playing 
a central role in how the simulation is situated (see “Context”). 
Emergent properties are not currently explained by either CARIN 
or the IPA model, while other theories account for their appear-
ance via elaboration of the combined concept, and ECCo holds 
that they arise naturally from the situationally-appropriate details 
in the simulation (see “Emergent Properties”). Indeed, ECCo is 
the only theory that is consistent with children’s developmen-
tal trajectory in first preferring to simulate two intact concepts 
to later becoming capable of simulating potential and much-
reduced concepts in combination (see “Conceptual Combination 
in Development”).
ECCo and the RCA model are the only accounts of concep-
tual combination that can accommodate the role of perceptual 
information in the combination processes. For example, Connell 
and Lynott (in press) showed that people are slower to simulate 
a novel conceptual combination (e.g., visual shimmering tuna) if 
their attention has already been engaged by a different perceptual 
modality in a previous trial (e.g., auditory loud motorcycle), and 
that this modality switching cost is not due to linguistic associa-
tions between words. Similarly, effects of visual occlusion (Wu and 
Barsalou, 2009) and the orienting of spatial attention (Estes et al., 
2008) are only compatible with the ECCo and RCA frameworks.
However, only ECCo is compatible with evidence that differ-
ent types of interpretation emerge from early commitment to a 
particular process. The RCA model adopts dual process theory’s 
assumption that relation- and property-based processes compete 
in parallel in the mind of each individual, with the first process 
to be completed providing the interpretation. However, there is 
no positive evidence for this assumption, as much of the evidence 
cited in favor of parallel processes is consistent with ECCo’s early 
commitment account. For example, relation-based interpreta-
tions are usually, but not necessarily, faster than property-based 
interpretations (Gagné, 2000; Estes, 2003a; Tagalakis and Keane, 
2006); however this does not mean that relation-based process-
ing tends to “win” a parallel race, but simply indicates that one 
process, from start to finish, is generally faster than the other 
(see “Destructive and Non-destructive Processing”). Also, the 
finding that property-based targets are slowed down by relational 
primes just as much as relation-based targets are slowed down by 
property primes (Estes, 2003a) does not mean that the processes 
compete with each other, but merely shows that the processes 
do not operate sequentially with property-based processing as 
a last resort.
Critical evidence for the early commitment account and against 
the parallel assumption comes from Lynott and Connell (2010), 
who showed that prosody affects the speed of property-based inter-
pretations, but not relation-based interpretations. Dual empha-
sis (i.e., equal prosodic stress on both nouns in the compound) 
types is questionable, with many of these categories serving only 
descriptive roles as a legacy of previous research (e.g., Downing, 
1977). ECCo’s destructive and non-destructive interpretations sub-
sume these categories, although their overlap is not isomorphic: 
while property-based interpretations are principally destructive, 
relational and hybrid interpretations conflate destructive and non-
destructive combinations.
Most, if not all, property-based interpretations are destructive 
combinations in ECCo. The IPA model tends to focus on the trans-
fer of a single property, although dual process, RCA and constraint 
theories are clear that multiple properties may be transferred. In 
ECCo, a destructive interpretation involves the reduction of one 
or both concepts to situationally appropriate aspects that can be 
meshed with the other concept’s affordances, which means that there 
is no default number of “properties” that may comprise a concept’s 
reduced form. So, for example, a zebra clam may indeed reduce 
zebra to a visual black-and-white striped pattern, but icicle fingers 
reduces icicle to a haptic, motor and proprioceptive representation 
of coldness and stiffness (see “Destructive Interpretations”).
Many relation-based interpretations qualify as non-destructive 
interpretations in ECCo. For example, CARIN specifies head-
  causes-modifier (e.g., flu virus), modifier-causes-head (e.g., mall 
headache),  head-uses-modifier  (e.g.,  gas  antiques)  and  so  on. 
However, one relation in CARIN’s taxonomy is always destructive 
(e.g., head-resembles-modifier: zebra clam). Furthermore, the same 
relation can vary in whether the actual interpretation is destructive 
or non-destructive. For example, the head-has-modifier relation 
is destructive in song book (described as a book that “has” songs) 
because song has been reduced to a purely visual representation 
(i.e., the song in song book does not contain any auditory com-
ponent, which is generally a core aspect of a song). In contrast, 
picture book (a book that “has” pictures) is non-destructive because 
the pictures in question are still intact entities in the pages of the 
book. Other inconsistent relations include head-made-of-modifier 
(e.g., destructive stone lion versus non-destructive stone wall) and 
head-is-modifier (e.g., destructive horse toy versus non-destructive 
servant girl). Because ECCo does not rely on a set of abstracted 
relations, focusing rather on situated simulations to derive mean-
ings, interpretations can be more specific than is possible within 
a finite relational taxonomy.
Hybrid interpretations are also split between destructive and 
non-destructive interpretations in ECCo. For example, a llama 
camel may be destructively interpreted as a cross between a llama 
and a camel: here, the resulting creature is part-llama and part-
camel, but neither llama nor camel is simulated in holistic form 
because  their  meshing  involves  representing  an  offspring  that 
retains some aspects of both. On the other hand, singer songwriter 
and pet fish both have non-destructive interpretations because there 
is still an intact singer and songwriter (or pet and fish) in the simu-
lation even though the concepts have been meshed into a single 
individual (see “Non-destructive Interpretations”).
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